The Low-Low Game paradox
In a recent paper Gambetta and Origgi (2013) focused their attention upon a relevant extreme form of resistance to change which seems suitable to describe the current Italian situation as well as any other more general cases. The authors shed light on the circumstances wherein everyone, when defecting, prefers the other players to defect as well, rather than cooperating.
With the aim of presenting the analysis in its simplest way, we consider the class of simultaneous ordinal 2 x 2 games based on pure strategy. Two players are considered and assumed to have two distinct strategies each: either they cooperate (C), either they defect (D). There are, thus, four possible results, and each of them depends on both players choices. Although the approach is ordinalist, games are easier to be interpreted through numerical payoffs, going from 1 to 4. Each player has a ranking of preferences upon the four possible payoffs. These ordinal preferences are indicated as 4 ≻ 3 ≻ 2 ≻ 1.
In line with the literature, we call R (as "Reward") the payoff obtained if both players decide to cooperate (C); P (as "Punishment") if they both opt for defection (D); T (as "Temptation") if player 1 chooses to defect (D) while player 2 decides to cooperate (C). Ultimately, we call S (as "Sucker") the situation in which player 1 opts for cooperation (C), while player 2 for defection (D).
In the Low-Low Game (Gambetta and Origgi, 2013) , represented in Figure 1, both players converge to the payoff which occupies the second place in their ranking. The paradox we need to explain regards the fact that P defeats each one seems therefore to be inclined to renounce to something (i.e. the cooperation C of the other player) and to obtain a lower reward (i.e. the defection D of the other). We claim that two explanations for this "irrational" choice can be found. The former consists in reviewing the variables included in the players payoffs, in order to maintain that each of them reaches a better final outcome with a lower level of public good. More precisely the "good" they aim to achieve through cooperative behaviors represents a "damage".
Secondly the other reason which Gambetta and Origgi (2013) mainly refer to suggests that agents remain trapped in a "downward" social game where everyone drowns in the swamp, because each player has internalized "perverse" social norms based on the reduction of cooperative behaviors.
In our opinion, both these points do not explain all of it. This paper tries, instead of simply proving the way the problem is displayed, to develop a theoretical framework which might help in drawing the "unexpected" trajectory the country undertook. We aim at doing this, mainly focusing on the recent Italian historical facts, but the logic behind this seems suitable for more general cases. In ¶2 we briefly review the existing literature, in the third ¶we introduce a discussion based on the notion of parallel games. In the fourth ¶, instead we propose a mechanism which is generated from loss of power to leaned helplessness. ¶5 concludes.
3 2 Resistance to Change: background literature Habits, customs -the so called informal institutions -as well as laws and norms have been proved to be exhibiting effects on economic behaviour, welfare and wellbeing throughout in the course of history all over the planet (Diamond, 2005; Putnam et al., 1994) . Since coined by Kurt Lewin (1946) the concept of resistance to change has been widely used to describe any micro, meso or macro process which proves its inability to change overtime.
As a matter of fact this has been a highly debated topic and here, we aim at scathing a bird eye view of the existing economic and non-economic literature born over the last 20 years grouping it according to the micro, meso and macro distinction. No claim of completeness can hold. Moreover, theories purely devoted to the resistance to change do not exist. Most scholars tend to reason on the conditions and processes of change to then question the cases in which these conditions do not hold or seize up, but very rarely some studies are devoted to the "negative" side of this process as such, and this is why the above mentioned paper of Gambetta and Origgi (2013) is of great interest.
Some scholars claim that in principle, resistance to change is a natural social mechanism. In field theory, it is defined as an equilibrium produced by the synergy of forces with different intensities and directions (Lewin, 1946) .
Being fields generated by individuals' interaction, change occurs subsequently to the dismantle of the status quo and follows three steps: from the melt down of the initial state, to chaos and finally towards a re-solidification of the new 4 state. At any level of analysis (i.e. micro, meso or macro), the notion of choice lies behind the success or failure of the process of change. According to Diamond (2005) there exist two characteristics which seem to be crucial in driving the change towards positive or negatives paths. The first one relates to the ability of long term planning, the second to the willingness to revise core values. The courage of acting with a long term strategy implies anticipatory decisions before the burst of a crisis and constitutes a feature for successful change. The latter also requires, again at any level, the willingness to make the due adjustments of core values in spite of their disproportionate difficulty. A non-dissimilar line of though to explain the success or failure of development projects is condensed in "The principle of the Hiding Hand" (Hirschman, 1967) . Action at micro and meso level is induced by an error, being it an understatement of the difficulties of a decision making process or an exaggeration of its future benefits. Only the lack of awareness of the efforts required, boosts improvements in social conditions. Moreover, the effort could not be bypassed without a serious overestimation of the prospective benefits.
In sociological studies most of the attention has been devoted to the phenomenon of change. Few attention has been given to persistence, the prime source of predictability and stability without which any society would be nonexistent (Patterson, 2010) . According to Patterson (2010) instead, taking institutional dynamics as a given, most of the attention should be focused on the "persistence puzzle". Some scholars as Bourdieu and Nice (2000) , although acknowledging that change is an incremental process driven by errors or deliberate choices, claim that the notion of habitus explains both the cultural and, indirectly also, the structural reproduction. According to Patterson instead, a unique double-edge concept is not suitable and he claims that institutional reproduction is led by 7 distinct but combinatorial mechanisms. Social learning and imitation allows inter and intra-generational reproduction. Secondly, reproduction occurs if some rules of the game become normative and part of the shared definition of reality. A third way for reproduction to become explicit is through the channel of hegemony or through culture specific cognitive processes. A forth mechanisms explaining reproduction is frequency driven selection: individuals excessively select a specific declination of the cultural process on the basis of its popularity. Reproduction is strictly related also to the communication dynamics in a community which produce specific individual interactions. The basic idea is that communication aims at transforming shared knowledge to a common ground of understanding minimizing confusion and uncertainty. Re-interpretation is instead a hidden form of persistence and consists in portraying a process and its meaning or practice in terms of others. Lastly, reproduction is originated by "embedded introjection". By transforming a clear pattern of beliefs into a spiritual one placed at the core of the dominant cultural institution, a collective imaginary is created and it will stay dormant for possibly long.
A useful explanation, straddling the macro, meso and micro classification, is the one proposed by Banerjee and Duflo (2011) . Resistance, and therefore unsuccessful process of change, results from "three Is": firstly from the absence of adjustments (Inertia); secondly from the claim to have the best solution, without assuming any alternatives (Ideology), and lastly from uncertainty over future outcomes (Ignorance).
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The most important neo-institutional strand of literature considering meso and macro phenomena is the one that goes from Robert Bates with Prosperity and Violence (2001), to the Institutions-Organizations-Beliefs framework proposed by North, Wallis and Weingast (2009) , up to the recent work of Besley and Perssons (2011; 2010) and Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) .
Bates argue that economic development and the transformation of violence into a publicly managed good are two parallel and mutually reinforcing processes. Nesting his reasoning on Tilly's work on early modern state formation (1975), Bates (2001) argues that pre-modern societies are characterized by effective but inefficient private provision of violence. Once this inefficiency is acknowledged, central authorities and decentralized interest groups get organized. This, together with industrialization, paves the way to public provision of violence. Violence changes therefore its nature: it is not a mean of predation anymore but rather a productive resource for protection and capital accumulation. The "domestication of violence" is hence the motor of successful change. Along these lines, North et. al. (2009) claim that politics, and particularly coercive power, deeply affects countries' opulence and security as well as the ranges within which they vary. Intra-élite coalitions and repartition of economic rents, the adaptive capacity of institutions and the nature of informal institutions are key determinants of growth and volatility. The different ways in which power is used, determines the ability of societies to face shocks either collapsing either adapting. Societies wherein citizens can openly access any economic and political organizations, experience positive and stable growth paths. Closed-access societies, in which the distribution of economic returns and access to organizations is heavily skewed towardsélites, are characterized by volatile growth, scarce democratic consent, highly centralized governments, personal relationships, high levels of inequality. Besley and Perssons (2011; 2010) claim that credible and cohesive political institutions are of crucial importance in generating change.
Political competition is the determinant as to how cohesive the institutions will be chosen to be. Ifélites feel no threat exists, they are less likely to create systems of control than if the possible loss of power is feared. This strongly recalls Acemoglu and Robinson's theory who argue that inclusive political and economic institutions, are the main drivers of economic development. Inclusive political institutions are defined as sufficiently centralized and pluralistic political structures in which absolute power cannot appear.
Conversely, the presence of extractive institutions, which prevent widespread participation and discourage productive activities, is the main reason for unsuccessful processes of change. It this therefore the set of interests held by the political power which might generate institutional persistence. The lack of binding commitment, which intrinsically affects every political arrangement, allows for predatory behaviors of the ruling party leading to inefficiencies (Acemoglu, 2003) .
The meso explanation of resistance to change par excellence is the one of groups' particularism at the core of Olson's work (1965) . A group is made of agents holding the same interests, but contemporary every group has its own interest. Single individuals' goal would not be achieved without collective action. The idea that groups act supporting their group interest follows from the assumption of rational and self interest behavior. However, this is not completely true. In fact, individual rationality in seeking higher level 8 of personal welfare does not match the group objective to advance towards a common goal. This only occurs in presence of either a coercive force or separate incentives given to group members to work for a common intention.
The lack of those elements at meso level implies the reduction of any more macro process of change. According to Putnam et al. (1994) instead the lack of change can be traced back to the scarce density if social capital. The denser are the networks of civil engagement -i.e. the quintessential form of social capital -the higher is the ability for individuals to cooperate for mutual benefits and therefore the more this should foster institutional success in the broader community.
Within the neo-insitutional strand of literature, David (1985; and Arthur (1989; carry out a micro analysis. Their notion of pathdependence, is meant to capture the way in which small, historical contingent events can generate self-reinforcing mechanisms which might lock the economy into not necessarily efficient particular structures and pathways of development. Resistance to change hence is the fruit of increasing returns, self-reinforcement, positive feedbacks and lock-in. The presence of increasing returns implies that the more frequently a decision is adopted the higher the benefits it produces (Pierson, 2000) . Self-reinforcing mechanisms instead imply that carrying out a choice activates a set of forces or institutional complementarities which encourage the support of the first decision made.
In case of positive feedbacks, once a decision is made it might generate positive externalities as soon as the same action is put in place by other agents.
Lock-in instead means that some choices or actions become more preferable than others because of the high number of people following them. But the true micro-level process which produce resistance to change can be traced back to conflict theory of decision making which intrinsically recalls the cognitive structure of agents. The main concern of normative and descriptive decision theory is to understand how a decision maker is willing to act in a given choice setting. The concept of willingness involves a series of values according to which a decision is said "good" or "bad" (i.e. a decision that is regretted to have been taken). Nevertheless, sometimes conflicting situations arise and constant and systematic analysis of the alternatives is impossible. In these cases a bolstering process starts (Janis and Mann, 1977) . Bolstering implies the agent, when evaluating all alternative, will filter relevant information with the purpose of supporting his preferred option. All information which sustains rival alternatives is suppressed. This tendency shows a preference for avoiding rather than solving conflictual situations. The bolstering phenomenon is analyzed in psychological literature under the name of cognitive dissonance. Cognitive dissonance according to Festinger (1962) refers to a situation involving conflicting attitudes, beliefs or behaviors which generate a sense of discomfort and dissatisfaction in the individual. This feeling is alleviated when one alternative wins over the others or all of them are made compatible. While cognitive dissonance expresses itself in the post-decisional phase, bolstering occurs before the decision is made binding. The distinction between the post-decisional rationalizationat the core of cognitive dissonance theoretical framework -and pre-decisional bolstering -the center of the conflict decision theory -seem to threaten the freedom of choice of individuals producing compliance or defiance which, on their hand, enable reaction to the social milieu (Rapoport, 1988) . This is the aspect this paper focuses upon trying to shed some light on the Italian glide path using parallel games.
An explanation based on parallel games
Every human being, as a member of a collectivity, is constantly involved in situations of strategic interaction with others whose interests might be, at least partially, in contrast to hers/his. These multiple situations concern (at least) the market, bureaucracy, democracy, job placement, political activities, familiar relationships and friendships, as well as national, ethnic and religious identities. The hypothesis we start from suggests that, very frequently, the various strategic interactions are connected with one another. What occurs in the market shapes what happens in the political sphere; national belonging affects religious choices; affective life influences working outcomes, and so on. It follows that a joint analysis of the occurrence of many situations can explain phenomena that would not be captured if the analysis was conducted separately. When an individual is engaged in several strategic interacting situations, either s/he can meet different agents in various occasions, either s/he relates to the same individuals in some others. In the first case, in line with Alt and Eichengreen (1989) , we refer to overlapping games, while in the second case we deal with parallel games. We hereby focus on parallel games only, as in our opinion, they are particularly effective in revealing how and why the relationship among certain subjects is implemented only in case of multiple strategic situations. The 2 x 2 simultaneous ordinal games based on pure strategy are 726 (Kilgour and Fraser, 1988) . Only 78 of them are ordinally different, meaning that all payoffs vary (Rapoport and Guyer, 1967; Robinson and Goforth, 2005) . For the sake of our argument we chose five games, whose interpretation appears able to represent recurring and relevant situations. The first, yet introduced, is the Low-Low Game (LLG). The second is the No Conflict Game (NCG) instead. As represented in Figure 2 , in this case both players chose the payoff they placed first in their rankings.
It depicts a social situation where the optimal scenario is reached without any contrasts, as both players share the same preference. Player 1 obtains 4 as payoff if R; he obtains 3 if T; he obtains 2 if S; lastly, he obtains 1 if P.
The same applies for player 2.
Player 1 Our idea is that a reason for selecting the LLG, interpreted as a form of resistance to change, resides in the fact that some games are carried out in parallel. Playing an LLG becomes rational as long as it is conducted together with other specific games. With no claim of elaborating an exhaustive analysis, we suggest some parallel games which contribute to clarify the concrete historical phenomena amongst which the one Gambetta and Origgi refer to, stands out: the Italian socio-economic decline. The latter can be traced back to the incapacity of the country to open up to change.
We call the first type of parallel games of "the Count and the Baroness". As we have claimed in ¶1, it would be irrational to play the LLG separately. However, the (D,D) strategy of the LLG is able to justify and autoreproduce itself if it is jointly enforced with the (C,C) strategy in the NCG:
every husband de facto flirts with everyone else's wife as officially every wife is faithful to her own husband. The theoretical point is that we can explain the priority of the defecting strategy on the second This method, if adequately shared by all players, can generate a fluid traffic flow which is even more regular than if traffic lights were respected. First of all, it has been proven that driving at the same speed of the traffic flow is safer (Lave, 1985) . Secondly, adapting to the other cars speed makes the risk of being sanctioned lower, as the police can only catch a small proportion of traffic rules-breakers (Dixit and Nalebuff, 2008) We call the third type of game of " the plagiarist Economist", wherein a SBG and a LLG simultaneously occur (as in the above mentioned case) but here a HG adds up. In their paper, Gambetta and Origgi (2013) agents' positive consumption increases if others consume an increasingly negative amount of that same good. Examples of crucial importance are prestige or power goods: it is possible for a person to benefit from them only at the expenses of others. If a dominant subject exists, someone who is dominated exists as well; if there is a person with a higher social status, someone with a lower social status therefore exists. If we recall a classic distinction by Leibenstein (1950) , RG produces a bandwagon effect: the higher is the general consumption of a good, the higher the incentive to consume it. Hence, the RG fosters forms of conformist behavior. On the contrary, PG produces a snob effect: the lower is the general consumption, the higher the push to take advantage of it. The PG, thus, favors opposite forms of behavior with respect to RG.
Let us imagine a society divided into two types of groups. Group type C holds "conformist" behavior and seeks for uniformity of consumption choices, whereas group type P holds "positional" behaviors and seeks for individual relative advantage, meaning that every member of the group aims at differentiating her/himself from other members. In a society there can be several C groups aiming at reaching an internal homogenization, but maintaining differences with respect to other groups. In recent Italy, for instance, professional corporations such as those of notaries, pharmacists, taxi drivers, established rules to create strong internal behavioral regularities for the members, but at the same time maintained the due differences to separate them from other corporations. On the other hand, there are groups P which, aim both at differentiating one another and promoting an inner positional competition.
As Thomas Marshall (Marshall, 1964, p.198) states: Boats' owners, for instance, are very different from the members of book clubs; within each group a specific competition to have the biggest boat or to become a member of the most prestigious club applies. Let us assume that both groups, C and P, can choose between two strategies as represented in figure 8 . The first strategy is denominated H and consists in aiming to high quality results; the other is instead named L and aims to get to low quality outcomes. For those aiming at a RG, a result H consists in the occurrence of a trickle-down effect: what is achieved by a limited number of people is also progressively obtained by the other members of the group, thus enhancing homogeneity and conformism. When group C chooses strategy 23 H, a "higher" egalitarian tendency arises. Considering private goods, this is the case of middle classes striving to get the consumption levels of the ruling classes, while lower classes strive for the level of consumption of middle classes. As it happened in Italy during the years of the so-called "economic miracle", a social mobility elevator is triggered: the director purchases a car, a washing-machine or an apartment but it will take five and ten years respectively for a manager or for an executive worker to purchase the same items. Although everyone strives for the same good, they cannot have it in the same amount of time. What happens for private goods, also occurs for RG. The latter are a class of local public goods, for which non-rivalness and non-excludability matter only within a certain set of relations (Uhlaner, 1989) . As a consequence, RG can be used by a single individual jointly with other members of the social network. During the Italian "economic miracle", the set of local public goods -from education to the health care system, from social security to solidarity, and so on -got institutionalized and expanded, contributing to an upward social mobility. This is represented by cell CH in Figure 8 .
As positions are socially scarce, for those who decide to have a PG, H is the result of a winners-take-all competition (Rosen, 1981) . Indeed, in order to distinguish Tom from James, the positional good must create social scarcity, through exclusion mechanisms based on pricing or limited access. If everyone could afford or access a tropical beach, there would no longer be a differentiation between agents. Given the "social scarcity" of positions, only someone wins, while many others lose. The higher the number of groups type P which choose high quality outcomes (H), the wider the spectrum of pur-sued PG. However, if a large number of groups P purses an equal number of PG, the society tends to diverge on multiple scales of values and goals. This might also imply a blooming of innovative actions, as innovation is fostered through the refusal of conformism and love for variety. This is represented by cell PH of Figure 8 .
Defense of gained positions Figure 8 When a group C selects strategy L, a form of "downward" egalitarianism occurs. As it happens in today's Italy, the social mobility elevator goes down for (almost) everyone (Pianta, 2012) . Along this glide path, the role of RG is crucial: indeed, the set of local public goods has gradually been flaking in Italy throughout the last three decades, with increasingly serious consequences which shifted down the social scale even more (ISTAT, 2013) .
This is represented by cell CL in Figure 8 . Lastly, when a group P opts for strategy L, the positional internal competition is blocked or weakened. This means the members of that group would fight for a specific good which confers them a specific status. This good can be obtained by few at the expense of many, but these few are institutionally able to compete. The differentiating (and sometimes innovative) dynamics of positionalities has ceased to apply.
A widely discussed example in Gambetta and Origgi (2013) is represented by the functioning of the university system in Italy. In a context that should be promoting a "virtuous" positional competition, an institutional arrest is observed. This is represented by cell PL of Figure 8 . Hence, column H represents a dynamic society. Cell CH describes an inclusive dynamics, whereas PH portrays a dynamics based on distinction. In a dynamic society, the "upward" egalitarianism of cell CH and the winner-take-all competition of cell PH coexist. While CH includes wider social groups, PH differentiates theélites (being or self-representing them as such). Contrarily, column L represents a declining society. Cell CL describes an inclusive decline, while cell PL pictures a privileged downfall. In a declining society, the "downward" egalitarianism of cell CL and the weakening of positional fight represented by cell PL, coexist. CL excludes wider social groups, whereas PL tends to normalizeélites, transforming them into groups that, rather than gaining a new status, firmly hold what they previously achieved.
How is it possible for a society to shift from column H to column L?
In order to answer this question it is at first necessary to state that such transition entails power loss processes, herewith called disempowerment. Indeed, the members of the several groups -either pursuing RG or PG -feel that the spectrum of their actions has shrunk: while in column H upward mobility and competition for distinction is possible, in column L there are possibilities for downward mobility and leverage of status goods. This paper does not aim at examining the historical concrete circumstances that fostered the intra-national or international disempowerment of groups of the Italian society (this analysis has been carried out especially by historians:
see, for example, Ginsborg (1998) states that any action is rational, as long as an individual prefers it to any alternative and as long as the market allows its fulfillment. It follows that any market equilibrium is a voluntary situation, as each agent tends to choose the best option within a set of circumstances which make her/his actions compatible with those of the others. Haavelmo observes that, in order to define a decision "involuntary", two conditions should be in place. Firstly, the agent has to be able to compare the current situation to an alternative practicable one; secondly, the agent should be able to realize that the alternative option is outside his/her personal scope of action, as it requires a collective action and therefore is not feasible. In this precise intersection individuals can be aware that some market equilibria are preferable to the existent ones, but if the necessary actions to achieve them are out of their scope of opportunity, they cannot do anything else but choosing the desired actions within the undesired context they are in. This entails the existence of macroeconomic facts which cannot be considered a simple sum of microeconomic decisions: institutional mechanisms, such as the market mechanism itself, as well as social conventions or opinion changes, limit individual action without being influenced other than in an indirect and obscure way (Dardi and Targetti, 1984, p.87,authors' translation Haavelmo's important definition does not concern only economic decisions.
The rise of involuntary decisions lays the ground for a possible transition from 27 column H to L: Agents are often forced to make choices that do not want to, as alternative voluntary decisions lay beyond her/his sphere of intervention. Hence, the inter-subjective condition that makes involuntary decisions possible constitutes the premise for the subjective condition of disempowerment. We are now at the second step of the reasoning: a loss of power (disempowerment) becomes impotence (powerlessness) when the individual faces processes that s/he perceives as uncontrollable. While disempowerment arises when the subject is not able to edit an event, powerlessness depicts any situation in which the agent is absorbed by an uncertain radical event which therefore falls outside her/his control. These two experiences might be contemporary but distinct. In case of disempowerment the agents has the awareness that the set of accessible alternatives for which is possible to calculate the risk has shrunk. In case of powerlessness the agent faces forms of uncertainty about the nature of the alternatives, the links between them, as well as about the outcomes that will arise from those links. A loss of power that slips away from the agent's control, and not only from her/his ability of intervention, is perceived as powerlessness. According to Rucker and Galinsky (2008) , the most immediate reaction to powerlessness is an increase of attention towards PG, as they are symbols of power.
Power relates to one's relative control over valued resources, whereas status relates to the respect one has in the eyes of others. Despite these conceptual differences, evidence suggests that power and status can compensate and substitute for each other. [. . . ] When one's power is threatened, individuals appear to place a greater value on products explicitly linked to status, think about products in terms of the sta-tus they convey, and place greater value on monetary wealth (Dubois et al., 2012 (Dubois et al., , p.1049 ).
The implication is that in a society wherein most groups loose power, the immediate response is often the pursuit of status and PG. This theoretical framework effectively applies to the situation Italy experienced over the last three decades, when an atomization of the communitarian fabric, individualistic ambition for success, exasperated exhibitionism and on the political ground the triumph of "Craxism and Belusconism" occurred (Dei, 2011) .
We finally reached the third and last step of our reasoning. In Italy, many people have strengthened propensity towards PG right when the entire country was moving from column H to L, and in particular from PH to PL. In the winners-take-all competition, typical of the cell PH, the majority of players lose power, while very few win. This generates temporary forms of disappointment and frustration when the game appears as fair and repeatable to whom is involved into it. Those who lose today still hope to win next time. The most common example is the continuous creation and implementation of national lotteries: almost no one wins, almost everyone loses money, but no one complains as everyone perceives the game as fair and repeatable. Contrarily, when agents, as in the situation described by the cell PL, strive for a status and a PG, but the winners-take-all competition is stuck or weakened, disappointment and frustration endure for long time.
This, in turn, additionally strengthens and diffuses the initial perception of powerlessness to which agents had tried to react through the pursuit of a PG. The ultimate result is that voluntary decisions tend to vanish from the conceivable possibility set and, even when concrete opportunities emerge, the 29 individual will not catch the possibility to change the status quo. This behavior is denominated learned helplessness (Abramson et al., 1978; Martinko and Gardner, 1982) . Figure 9 summarizes this framework. would be possible to do so, Tom consequently will tend not to contrast their behaviors. As result any PG is waived, even when there is a concrete occasion to compete for it. Agents get involved in a "downward" game in a conformist manner. They move from cell PL to CL. Obviously, even in today's wrecked
Italy there are social groups who continue playing in the other three boxes of Figure 9 . But it is cell CL, and the Low-Low Game it represents, that better describes the actual condition of the country.
Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have introduced and discussed some theoretical elements -parallel games, the nexus between involuntary decisions and loss of powerthat might contribute in explaining the extreme cases of resistance to change occurring in today's Italy. The entire paper revolves around the paradoxical logic of Low-Low Game, according to which everyone when defecting prefers other players to defect as well, instead of cooperating. The paradox is that, as displayed in Figure 1 , (D,D) confers higher payoffs (4,4) to both players. It follows that players gradually slip off in "quicksand", hanging each other on a mutual connivance that makes any alternative worse at their eyes. Feeling fine, while entering a vicious spiral, explains the reasons for both the absence of any vital reaction and the passive perpetuation of the Italian glide path.
